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Info |
Last Modified |
| 4 months ago |
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Description |
sSMTP creates a logfile /tmp/ssmtp.log and the data in this logfile is user specified. It's possible to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on the ssmtp.log temporary log file with the permissons of the ssmtp program (normally root).
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Classification |
Location:
Local Access Required
Attack Type:
Other
Impact:
Loss of Integrity
Exploit:
Exploit Available
Disclosure:
OSVDB Verified
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Technical |
The vulnerable call is in log_event. Log_event vulnerable call:
#ifdef LOGFILE
if((fp = fopen("/tmp/ssmtp.log", "a")) != (FILE *)NULL) {
(void)fprintf(fp, "%s\n", buf);
(void)fclose(fp);
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Solution |
Currently, there are no known upgrades, patches, or workarounds available to correct this issue.
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Products |
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sSMTP
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2.50.6 |
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Credit |
- priestmaster - priest
 priestmaster.org -
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BlogsProvided by Technorati
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None found at this time
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